(2.4 km) away from Ljubljana airport, the British charter plane Britannia 102, G-ANBB, hit the tops of pine trees, crashed, and was set on fire in the forest, about one mile (1.6 km) from the main road and about 16 miles from Ljubljana.
Of 116 people on board 91 died on the spot from extremely violent mechanical injuries and from fire; many of these were partly or completely charred. Three very severely injured passengers died during transport or a few minutes after admission to hospital due to injuries incompatible with life; autopsy later confirmed multiple destructive craniocerebral, thoracic and abdominal lesions with serious injuries of extremities and burns in addition.
Twenty-two injured people were admitted and treated in hospital; 3 of these died and 19 survived.
SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES AND ORGANIZATION
General Situation in the Hospital Just Before the Disaster The whole Ljubljana central hospital including the surgical services was antiquated (built mainly in 1895) and overcrowded. At the moment of the alarm not a single bed was vacant in the casualty or plastic surgery wards (where burns were treated). Half the staff of surgeons, nurses and ancillary personnel were on holiday. It was in the small hours, with all the attendant inconveniences, and the town broadcasting station, which could have been of great help, had finished transmitting at midnight. First Aid and Transport The way from the main road over the fields to the scene of the accident was extremely difficult: the wheels of the rescuing vehicles sank and stuck in the mud. Visibility was nil due to thick smoke. In addition, the wreckage of the plane and the victims were scattered in the forest over an area of about 100 x 70 m, hidden by broken trees, shrubs and high grass. The fire brigades succeeded in extinguishing fire and smoke just before dawn, although they had been on the spot a few minutes after the crash.
The factors and activities connected with quenching of fire, searching for survivors, first aid and transport have been analysed elsewhere (Derganc 1969) .
The Response to the Alarm at the Hospital The senior surgeon on duty got the appalling message by telephone fifty minutes after the crash. This rather long delay was never satisfactorily explained. The message ran as follows: 'A hundred bumed and injured passengers are to be expected.'
In accordance with the pre-existing disaster scheme the responsible surgeon immediately put into action the whole emergency system of the hospital.
A mobile surgical team, consisting of a senior accident surgeon, an anesthetist and a theatre sister with complete emergency and resuscitation equipment, was instantly sent out by ambulance. All available surgeons and anesthetists were urgently called into hospital by telephone. The calling of sisters, nurses and ancillary personnel was hardly possible in the night as they lived scattered in the town and suburbs and could not be reached by telephone. The central blood transfusion institute was mobilized for maximal performance.
All departments of the central hospital were alerted and smaller civilian and military hospitals were asked for help. All units were asked to prepare as many beds as possible and to have the theatres ready. Evacuation of all patients in the surgical wards who could be discharged without danger was started at once.
Eight places for admission of casualties and sorting were arranged in the central hospital, in the adjacent polyclinic service and in two other hospitals. Six theatres were prepared for immediate action.
At the moment of arrival of the first ambulances with casualties, at 2 a.m., there were available 3 accident surgeons, 8 general surgeons, 4 anmsthetists, 2 plastic surgeons, 2 cardiovascular surgeons, 1 thoracic surgeon, 1 neurosurgeon and 2 urologists. Senior surgeons took over the sorting of casualties and a senior plastic surgeon took the general responsibility for burns.
The Main Shortcomings in Organization
The lack of a radio transmission set at the hospitalindispensable for a disaster situationprevented direct communication with the place of the crash, so we could not know the actual number of survivors until 3 a.m. when all had been admitted and we did not know what was going on at the scene of the accident. This fact caused over-extensive arrangements, loss of time and energy, and unnecessary worry as to how to cope with a hundred burn casualties, a virtually impossible task.
Another serious hindrance was the paradoxical personnel situation: there were more than enough surgeons, but a severe shortage of sisters and nurses, and practically none of the badly needed ancillary personnel such as porters, maids, typists and couriers.
The omission of a special and competent information service for the outside world was a further failure which unnecessarily disturbed the work of the surgical staff.
HUMAN ASPECTS
Psychical shock and anxiety affected many survivors more than multiple somatic injuries. The tiagedy happened in a foreign and unknown country. Darkness,the feeling of being desperately lost and uncertainty about adequate help were the most striking features. The injured survivors felt that poor facilities for rescue as well as for first aid and medical treatment were to be expected.
None of the survivors could see or know who else had survived and the majority feared for their close relatives who had been with them on the plane. In fact 8 survivors lost 16 close relatives: 3 lost both parents, 4 lost wife or husband, 5 lost children and 1 a sister. Needless to say, the terrible truth had to be explained to the patients gradually in view of their psychosomatic condition. The disclosure of the loss of parents to the burned children, after they recovered, presented even for the hardened surgeon a rarely experienced emotional effort.
A young survivor who was unconscious for seven days had been registered under another name; his injured mother, who identified her unconscious son after five days, had supposed him to be dead. One familyfather, mother and daughterhad the astonishing luck to escape from death entirely. A young married couple was saved with minor injuries only.
After admission to hospital the language barrier presented a particular difficulty for the severely injured and emotionally affected survivors. Early in the morning, therefore, we asked for help in interpreting from a group of able medical students who remained day and night with the British patients. Later a group of Red Cross volunteers joined in this work. Both groups acted not only as interpreters but also as auxiliary nursing personnel. Two British teachers who were at that time working in Ljubljana joined this group. They worked as social workers and cared all the time for the mental comfort and entertainment of the patients. The general morale of the survivors was greatly supported by the frequent presence and help of British consular authorities from Zagreb and of representatives of the airline company who did everything possible to alleviate the life of the patients. The general sympathy and helpfulness of the Slovene inhabitants contributed also to the mental comfort of the survivors.
It must be understood that there was an initial lack of confidence in surgeons and in the health service as a whole in a foreign country. This was Section ofPlastic Surgery fortunately overcome very quickly after personal contacts were established.
CASUALTIES

Mechanism ofInjuries
Anamnestic data of the survivors regarding the mechanism of the injunes were absolutely inconclusive. After the shock phase was over and later during the recovery period in hospital we repeatedly tried to obtain from the survivors answers to two main questions: (1) When and how they were injured and/or burned. (2) How they had escaped from the burning wreckage.
It was impossible to reconstruct the events at impact and immediately afterwards. The data were scarce and incoherent. Some of the survivors remembered that they were 'blown out with their seats' and then crawled away from the fire. It is likely that the impact was so violent that the survivors sustained cerebral concussion followed by different degrees of amnesia. The enormous psychical shock also clouded their perception of subsequent events connected with escape and rescue.
The survival rate of passengers in the rear part of the plane was 64%; in the central part only 3 %, and the 3 survivors from the central part of the plane were sitting in the rear seats.
It was impossible to elucidate the general and particular mechanism of trauma even after an analysis and comparison with findings at the place of the crash. The location and position immediately after the crash of different parts of the plane and of the bodies of the deceased and survivors was carefully recorded, and the events and dynamics of the impact were reconstructed by experts, but we stil do not know what forces and objects caused the mechanical injuries to the survivors.
The causes of burns could be reconstructed and explained with more probability.
Severity ofBurns and MechanicatInjuries
None of the 22 survivors sustained only burns, but 2 had no burns at all. In assessing the severity of injuries, burns could not beevaluated separately from mechanical injuries. The particular burns and mechanical components of the injuries found in our case material may be grouped as follows: Classification of survivors in accordance with the severity of their injuries was possible only by simultaneous evaluation of all injuries sustained by each patient.
REVIEW OF BURNS
Extent
The 20 burn cases were classified into three groups: (1) Burns of 20-40 % BSA, 7 cases (35 Y.).
(2) Burns of 5-20 % BSA, 7 cases (35 Y.). (3) Burns of less than 5 % BSA, 6 cases (30 %.).
Depth
As would be expected in flash burns epidermal depth was found in 8 cases (40%), superficial dermal in all 20 cases (100%/) and deep dermal in 14 cases (70%). Burns of epidermal, superficial dermal and deep dermal depth were, of course, present together in most survivors different proportions.
Subdermal (deep or full-thickness) burns pre. sented a relatively small proportion of the burned areas; they were present in 8 cases (40%Y.). In 3 patients the full-thickness skin loss amounted to two-thirds or more of the whole burned surface. The deep (subdermal) burns were probably inflicted by secondary fires, burning clothes and other objects.
Type
The majority of burns were flash burns. We believe they were caused by the explosion of fuel tanks at the moment of impact or later. There were 10 cases (50%Y.) of pure flash burns; the remainder were flash and flame burns, the latter caused by the post-crash fire (10 cases, 50%).
Respiratory Tract Damage
In 2 cases lesions of respiratory passages were found clinically andpost mortem. It is not possible to explain their origin satisfactorily. One of these 2 cases was a brave girl who rescued a little boy from fire despite the fact that at the impact she had sustained fractures of 5 ribs and a large deep laceration of the femorogluteal region; probably she sustained deep flame burns and inhaled fumes during the rescue of the boy. Tracheostomy was necessary in both cases. Initial Care andLater Treatment in Hospital Most of the injured were apathetic and quiet on admission; only a few groaned or asked for help. As few questions as possible were put to the patients at examination; personal data were purposely omitted in severely injured patients. They were labelled by numbers on adhesive strips attached to wrist or ankle.
At sorting, priority for first surgical care was given to injuries in Groups 1 and 2. Those with manifest or latent shock were brought into the wards for intensive care or directly to the theatre.
Two emergency operations for associated mechanical trauma were required: one, a thoracotomy performed immediately after admission for hemorrhage; the other, drainage and decompression of a tension pneumothorax.
There were 12 cases (54%) of manifest or imminent shock. Sedation and transfusions were started immediately. In the first instance burns were assessed approximately for extent and depth. Intravenous fluid therapy in burns was calculated and performed according to the Mount Vernon scheme, with due regard to the individual response.
Cleansing and dressing of burns under 15% BSA in patients with no other serious injuries was performed under sedation as soon as shock was under control. At the same time smaller lacerated wounds were sutured under local anaesthesia.
In unshocked patients X-rays and other detailed examinations were carried out successively.
In major bums (over 20 % BSA), or in burns of less extent in cases with extensive and deep lacerations or fractures, formal surgical procedures were carried out in the morning under general anesthesia when the state of the circulation was satisfactory. Exact charting was done during these procedures and plans for further fluid therapy, antibiotics, other medicaments and nursing were instituted. In 2 burned patients primary fixation of fractures was performed on the morning after the accident. In a third case the femur was nailed on the thirteenth day. The remaining fractured extremities were put in plaster of Paris.
Local Therapy ofBurns All burns, except those of face and neck, were treated by dressings.
In 6 burned patients (30 %) excision and autografting were performed. In 2 cases this was done in one stage, in 3 cases in two stages and in one case in three stages. In 3 patients the grafts were applied the day after excision in order to get a safer take. The first stage of excision and grafting was done on the 7th day in 3 cases and on the 19th, 20th or 22nd day in the others. In all 6 patients no single graft was lost.
The procedure of delayed primary excision and grafting, routinely used at the Unit since 1964, was not feasible in this series for understandable subjective and objective reasons. There were not enough surgeons experienced in this method and we were overloaded with work due to the large number of bums.
Deaths Three (13.6%) of the 22 survivors died, the causes being: (I) Massive pulmonary fat embolism (woman aged 55, 2nd day). (2) Pulmonary fat embolism and thermal damage to the respiratory tract (girl aged 18, 5th day). (3) Burns of the respiratory tract and pseudomonas septicemia (girl aged 20, 12th day).
Results
The final survival rate in this air disaster was 16 % of the total number of people on board.
Besides the mortality, the healing time and the function and appearance of the affected areas are criteria of therapy.
In assessing the overall results of the burned survivors the heavy load of associated mechanical injuries must be taken into consideration.
The duration of hospital treatment was as follows: 8 survivors were discharged within 14 days, 3 within 28 days and 8 within 6 weeks. All were ambulant and with healed burn wounds. None was badly disabled.
The late results of our treatment were reviewed at different hospitals in Britain.
Conclusions
(1) A surprisingly high survival rate may be expected even in the worst aircrashes.
(2) A detailed plan for action in disaster should exist at every hospital. It must include arrangements for the management of burns.
(3) There are definite advantages if the burn unit is located close to other surgical units. Mass emergencies demand the simultaneous co-operation of all surgical specialists. (4) In coping with mass burn casualties a consistent use of delayed primary excision and grafting of dermal and subdermal burnsa very rewarding method in normal circumstancesis hardly feasible.
